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ABSTRACT 
 
The behavior and determinants of market to revenue ratios in public and private capital 
markets is examined. Three samples are analyzed : (1) all publicly traded stocks listed at 
some time on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ in the 1980 to 2004 period, (2) sample of 
over 300 so-called ―internet companies‖ in the 1996 to 2004 period, and (3) over 5,500 
privately held venture capital backed companies in the 1992 to 2004 period. Both 
company size and the most recent revenue growth rate are found to explain significant 
variation across companies in their market to revenue multiples—smaller companies have 
higher multiples and companies with higher recent revenue growth rates have higher 
multiples. We also document how the capital market appears to use a broad based 
information set when setting market to revenue multiples for companies with negative 
revenue growth rates—transitory revenue growth components appear to be identified (in 
a probabilistic sense) by the capital market. Contrary to much anecdotal comment, we 
present evidence that the capital market behaved directionally along the lines predicted 
by capital market theory in the pricing of internet stocks in the 1996 to 2004 period. 
 
KEY WORDS: MARKET TO REVENUE MULTIPLE, PRICE/SALES RATIO, 
PUBLIC COMPANIES, PRIVATE COMPANIES, VENTURE CAPITAL, INTERNET 
COMPANIES, TRANSITORY REVENUE 
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I. Introduction 
The market capitalization to revenue ratio (sometimes called price/sales ratio) is of central 
interest in many areas of capital market investment analysis and research. These areas include 
fundamental analysis, acquisition analysis, and examination of returns from quantitative 
investment trading strategies.
1
 Revenue forecasts now are part of most security analyst reports.
2
 
This paper provides an extensive analysis of market capitalization to revenue multiples (hereafter 
MKTt/REVt) and their drivers. We examine MKTt/REVt multiples for three samples, each of 
which is of much interest in its own right. Sample One includes all publicly-traded stocks listed at 
some time on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ over the 1980 to 2004 period. Sample Two 
comprises roughly 300 publicly-traded ―Internet companies;‖ the sample has most of its 
observations in the 1996-2004 period. Sample Three comprises over 5,500 privately-held, 
venture-backed companies from primarily the 1992-2004 period. Comparisons across the three 
samples strengthens the reliability of the inferences we draw about the behavior and determinants 
of MKTt/REVt multiples.  
 
Key findings in this paper include: (1) Company size is a significant predictor of MKTt/REVt 
ratios with smaller companies having higher MKTt/REVt ratios; (2) Past revenue growth is a 
significant predictor of the level of the MKTt/REVt ratio; and (3) the capital market takes into 
account transitory components of revenue when setting MKTt/REVt ratios. Underlying factors 
explaining these findings are examined. The use of data pre, during, and post the 1998 to 2000 
period also enables us to explore factors associated with the so-called ―internet bubble‖ period. 
Our results are consistent with the capital market behaving in this period more rationally along 
the predictions of capital market theory than many observers are willing to recognize.  
                                                 
1
 See, for instance, O‘Hara and Lowry (2009). 
2
 IBES started reporting security analyst revenue forecasts approximately 20 years after it started reporting 
EPS forecasts.  It started reporting one-year ahead and two-year ahead revenue (EPS) forecasts in 1996 
(1976).  It started reporting long term revenue (EPS) growth forecasts in 1999 (1981).  By 2004, 
85.18%/83.68% of companies in the IBES sample of companies had one-year ahead/two-year ahead 
security analyst revenue forecasts; the comparable percentages for one-year ahead/two-year ahead EPS 
forecasts were 90.87%/89.50%.  Ertimur, Mayew, and Stubben [2011] probe explanations for the issuance 
of revenue and expense forecasts by security analysts. 
4 
II. Importance of Research and Literature Review 
The findings in this paper have relevance for multiple research areas, including capital market 
valuation research, management of reported financial numbers research, capital market 1998-
2001 ―bubble‖ research, and early-stage company research.  
 
Capital Market Valuation Research 
Much valuation research using market multiples has emphasized market (price) to earnings or 
market to book value. MKTt/REVt analysis is also important in valuation research. Analysis of 
market-to-revenue multiples can be motivated by both the revenue variable itself being an 
informative signal about future value-relevant parameters and by revenues being a ―substitute‖ 
variable for situations in which negative earnings or book value are encountered.  
 
A growing number of studies have documented the differential or incremental information 
content of revenue vis-à-vis other variables. Ertimur, Livnat, and Martikainen [2003] report that a 
dollar of surprise in revenues has higher capital market information content than a dollar of 
surprise in expenses. Hypothesized explanations include a persistence explanation, a homogeneity 
explanation, and an earnings management explanation. Berger [2003] argues that the persistence 
explanation – ―investors react more strongly to a [revenue] surprise because these are less 
transitory than expense surprises‖ (p. 213) – is the most credible explanation of the three 
proposed. Ghosh, Gu, and Jain [2005], using an earnings response coefficient (ERC) 
methodology, report that ―relative to the cost reduction firms, earnings for the revenue-growth 
firms are more persistent… revenue-supported earnings growth is likely to be more sustainable 
because revenue is the key value driver and its growth often reflects the underlying product 
differentiation strategy‖ (p. 19). Keung [2010] reports incremental information content to analyst 
revenue forecasts when they simultaneously make changes to their earnings and revenue 
forecasts. The research in this paper provides systematic evidence to support the revenue 
persistence / momentum argument. We also document across multiple samples that companies 
with higher positive revenue growth in the most recent year have higher MKTt/REVt multiples.  
5 
 
Many valuation studies on market multiples, by their choice of variable(s) to examine, exclude 
sizable numbers of interesting and important observations. For example, research on market 
(price) to earnings multiples invariably deletes observations with non-positive earnings. This 
deletion can have sizable impacts on the generalizability of the results. Appendix A of this paper 
reports the percentages of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ companies with negative net income. 
The following percentages relate to the ―high-technology‖ subsample (covering the computer 
hardware, software, telecom, and biotech/pharmaceuticals industries) and the ―all other‖ 
subsample of companies listed on these exchanges: 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
High-Tech Companies 30.3% 37.2% 39.1% 56.8% 50.3% 
All Other Companies 16.3% 23.1% 17.2% 22.3% 22.7% 
 
Companies listed on NASDAQ (on average, smaller and younger) have a higher percentage of 
negative net income than companies listed on the NYSE and AMEX. Core, Guay, and Van 
Buskirk [2003], in a study of market to book value multiples, report losing 5,355 observations 
(4.7%) from their sample when requiring companies to have positive book value. They note that 
―deleting firms with negative book value of equity removes a greater percentage of young (7.5%) 
and high-technology (5.6%) firms‖ (p. 51). 
 
Research that compares the relative ―performance‖ of MKTt/REVt vis-à-vis other market 
multiples highlights the potentially severe deletion that can occur in traditional MKTt/INCt or 
MKTt/BVt multiple studies. Consider the Liu, Nissim, and Thomas [2002] study which adopted a 
―horse-race‖ ranking methodology in which the ability of alternative accounting variables to 
predict the current stock price was compared. The variables included six historical series (cash 
flow, cash flow from operations, EBITDA, revenues (sales), earnings, and book value of equity) 
and two forward-looking series (analyst forecasts of EPS and long-term growth in EPS). The 
6 
conclusion was that ―despite the importance of top-line revenues, its value-relevance is limited 
until it is matched with expenses‖ (pp. 137-138). The sample examined had sizable reductions – 
they excluded ―firm-years with negative values for any value driver‖ and ―firms not covered by 
IBES, typically firms with low and medium market capitalization.‖ The authors noted that their 
―results may not be descriptive of startup firms reporting losses and high growth firms with 
negative operating cash flows‖ (p. 138). 
 
The research in this paper examines MKTt/REVt multiples. The observations we delete due to 
non-positive denominators are minimal vis-à-vis studies on MKTt/INCt or MKTt/BVt multiples.
3
 
Moreover, we present results for different samples, some of which represent companies with 
below average representation in previous research on market multiples (namely technology and 
smaller companies). The privately-held venture-backed company sample we examine has only 
recently been the subject of empirical research. Our results highlight how companies with either 
negative net income or negative book value can still be the subject of capital market multiple 
research as opposed to being ignored in a ―deleted observations‖ subsample.  
 
“Management” of Reported Financial Numbers 
 The earnings management literature has examined multiple dimensions, including analysis of the 
revenue series, various expense series, balance sheet items, and cash flow items. Stubben [2010] 
examines the ability of revenue and accrual models to detect simulated and actual earnings 
management. Callen, Robb, and Segal [2004] illustrate research with a focus on the revenue 
series. They report finding that ―revenues are value relevant in explaining market value of equity 
whereas earnings are not significant in explaining the market value of equity for firms reporting 
negative earnings. Given our assumption that revenue manipulation flows though accounts 
receivable, we show that firms with a more extreme string of past and anticipated losses report 
higher accounts receivable to sales ratio‖ (p. 30). Bowen, Davis, and Rajgopal [2002] study 
                                                 
3
 An analysis of Compustat companies listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ finds only 15 negative 
annual revenue observations over the 1980-2004 period. We examined the respective 10K‘s of each of the 
15 negative revenue observations – 3 were errors in Compustat.  
7 
revenue reporting policies of internet companies. They report that ―the pressure to seek external 
financing influences Internet managers‘ choices to report barter and/or grossed-up revenue.‖ The 
transitory revenue results in Section VIII of this paper provide further insight into how the 
reported revenue series may differ from that which the capital market views as value relevant.  
 
Analysis of 1998-2000 Capital Market “Bubble” 
Phrases such as ―bubble period,‖ ―irrational exuberance,‖ and ―Internet euphoria‖ have been used 
to describe the 1998 to 2000 capital market period. There were major swings in the market 
capitalization of many companies in this period. Multiple studies have been undertaken of the 
valuation of Internet companies in this period (see for example, Trueman, Wong, and Zhang 
[2000, 2001] and Hand [2001, 2003]). These studies typically analyze companies in the era when 
stock prices were increasing or at historically ex post high levels. Core, Guay, and Van Buskirk 
[2003] examine the determinants of market to book value multiples for several samples (all firms, 
high-tech and young firms) in the 1975 to 1999 period. They conclude that while the regression 
models‘ ―explanatory power decline in the New Economy subperiod… the regression model‘s 
structure during the New Economy subperiod is not unusual compared to other subperiods‖ (p. 
43).  
 
We analyze the 1980 to 2004 period, which includes the subsequent dramatic reductions in 
market capitalization of many stocks as well as their prior sizable runups. This coverage provides 
a stronger foundation to make inferences about the 1998-2000 period vis-à-vis other periods. 
Moreover, we examine venture-backed privately-held companies as well as publicly-traded 
companies. This sample provides further insight into the so-called ―bubble period‖ as many 
public companies with dramatic increases in market capitalizations in the 1998-2000 period came 
from our venture-backed sample of companies.  
 
Early-Stage Company Valuation and Growth 
8 
There is an emerging literature on how early stage companies grow over time and the factors that 
affect their valuation. One stream of this literature has focused on the valuation and financial 
evolution of privately-held venture capital backed companies (see, for example, Davila, Foster, 
and Gupta [2003], Hand [2005], and Armstrong, Davila, and Foster [2006]). Another stream of 
research examines revenues and revenue forecasts of these companies (see, for example, 
Armstrong, Davila, Foster, and Hand [2007]). A third stream examines the evolution of the 
management control systems (including revenue/sales budgeting) of early-stage companies – see, 
for example, Davila [2005], Davila and Foster [2005, 2007], Sandino [2007], Davila, Foster and 
Li [2009], and Davila, Foster and Jia [2010]. Research is also focusing on the financial statements 
prepared or released by start-up or privately held ventures – see Cassar [2009] and Allee and 
Yohn [2009]. Hand [2011] documents how, for a sample of 1,133 venture-backed companies, 
both financial (current year revenues) and non-financial (patents, headcount, etc.) explain one-
year-ahead revenue forecasts. Extensive evidence on the revenue growth rates of early-stage 
companies in many countries is in Foster, Davila, Haemmig, He, Jia, von Bismarck and Wellman 
[2011]. The research in this paper extends this literature by examining factors that explain 
differences in the revenues of early-stage companies as well as the drivers of early-stage company 
valuation.  
 
III RESEARCH HYPOTHESES EXAMINED 
We examine the following three hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis One. Smaller companies have higher MKTt/REVt ratios. Smaller companies are 
hypothesized to have greater potential for future higher revenue growth rates. There is strong 
evidence supporting Hypothesis One. This finding highlights the impact that sample deletion 
procedures can play in excluding interesting and important observations. Smaller companies, on 
average, are more likely to have negative net income or negative book value. They are also less 
likely to have extensive analyst coverage. In our samples, smaller companies are more likely to 
come from the high technology sector where intangible assets are of much interest. Revenues for 
9 
such companies potentially are an important signal that they are converting ―investments‖ in 
intangible assets (ideas, innovations, discoveries, development of a sales force, etc.) into 
products/services commercially valued by customers or partners.  
 Hypothesis Two. Companies with higher recent positive revenue growth rates will have 
higher MKTt/REVt ratios than companies with lower recent positive revenue growth rates. Past 
revenue growth is hypothesized to have significant momentum (i.e., persistence) such that the 
higher the most recent year‘s revenue growth, the higher the likely future revenue growth. There 
is strong evidence supporting Hypothesis Two.  
 Hypothesis Three. Companies with negative reported revenue growth and higher 
MKTt/REVt ratios have a higher likelihood of negative transitory revenue. Transitory revenue is 
the difference between reported revenue and underlying revenue. The capital market is 
hypothesized to use a broad information set (certainly larger than just the most recent revenue 
growth observation) and is able to identify the companies whose current reported revenue 
contains a higher negative transitory component. There is strong evidence supporting Hypothesis 
Three.  
 
 
IV. Samples of Companies Examined 
Three samples of companies are examined in this paper. These three samples were chosen to 
ensure sizable cross-sectional and time-series differences in MKTt/REVt multiples of the 
companies examined. They were also chosen to gain insight into the 1998-2000 period where 
MKTt/REVt multiples for large numbers of publicly and privately traded companies reached 
levels not previously encountered.  
 
IV.A.  Sample One: Publicly Traded Companies in Selected SIC Industries on NASDAQ 
and NYSE/AMEX 
 
10 
Companies of particular interest in our research are those with extreme movements in market 
capitalization. Extreme variation in the numerator of the revenue multiple enables the research to 
probe the magnitude of any associated variation in the denominator of the market-to-revenue 
multiple. The 1998-2001 period is a recent period with very large variations in market 
capitalizations. Focusing on this period, we used the following criteria to identify two subgroups 
with differing variations in market capitalization.  
 
First, we calculated the sequence of end-of-month aggregate market capitalizations from January, 
1998 to December, 2001 of all companies on the NASDAQ, AMEX, and NYSE exchanges in 
every three-digit SIC code. For each three-digit SIC industry, we then found the:  
(1) High value of that three-digit SIC industry group‘s market capitalization,  
(2) Low value before the date of the high value but after January, 1998, and  
(3) Low value after the date of the high value but before December, 2001.  
 
Second, we then calculated the ratio of high-to-low market capitalizations (a) before the peak 
(from (1) and (2)), and (b) after the peak (from (2) and (3)). The average of the two ratios from 
(a) and (b) measures the relative increase and decrease in aggregate value of the three-digit SIC 
industry group during the 1998-2001 period. We next ranked all SIC industries using the average 
ratio and chose the top six industries with a peak individual aggregate market capitalization of at 
least $1 trillion. These six SIC industries we put into four industry groups—computer hardware 
(SIC codes 357, 366 and 367), computer software (737), telecommunications (481), and 
biotechnology/pharmaceutical (283).
4
  
 
                                                 
4
 The analysis used to identify the two Sample One sub-samples is conducted at the three-digit SIC industry 
level and not the company level.  Our industry market capitalization amounts are based on all companies 
listed at the chosen date of interest.  As new companies list or existing companies delist, there will be a 
changing number of companies underlying the aggregate industry market capitalizations at different dates.   
11 
Table 1 (Panel A) reports the aggregate market capitalization information (as of 1/1/1998, 
3/10/2000, and 12/31/2001) and the number of companies (as of 3/10/2000) for the following 
groups:
5
 
I. All Companies 
II. Pooled Selected SIC Industries (II.A + II.B + II.C + II.D) 
II.A. Computer Hardware (357, 366, 367) 
II.B. Computer Software (737) 
II.C. Telecommunications (481) 
II.D. Biotechnology/Pharmaceuticals (283) 
III. All Other Companies (in I. but not in II). 
 
At the March 10, 2000 peak, our four selected industry groups comprised approximately 50% of 
the total market capitalization of the NYSE/AMEX/ NASDAQ. NASDAQ firms in Group II 
made up 57.6% of the total NASDAQ market capitalization. NYSE/AMEX firms in Group II 
made up 42.4% of NYSE/AMEX total market capitalization.  
 
Although the Sample One selection criteria focused only on the 1998-2001 period, it is interesting 
to note that our Selected SIC industries subsample has differed from the All Other Companies 
subsample on several key risk related variables for many years prior to the 1998-2001 period. 
Appendix A reports that from at least 1985, companies in the Selected SIC Industries subsample 
have had (a) higher security market risk (measured by both the Beta and standard deviation of 
security returns), and (b) a higher percentage of companies with negative net income vis-à-vis the 
All Other Companies subsample. Some key differences we find between subsamples II and III in 
the 1998-2001 period are by construction of the research design. However, differences we 
observe both pre-1998 and post-2001 are not by construction.  
                                                 
5
 March 10, 2000 is the date when the NASDAQ reached its peak value (up through December 31, 2004).  
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IV.B. Sample Two: Publicly Traded Internet Companies 
 In the late 1990‘s and early 2000‘s the phrase ―internet company‖ was used to describe many 
new companies where the internet played a key role in user engagement or revenue yield. 
Revenues rather than net income was the more frequently used financial statement item in 
valuation analysis of these so-called Internet companies. This was in part due to most such 
companies not having positive net income, especially in the 1998-2001 period. Sample Two 
comprises publicly traded Internet companies drawn from a database on Jay Ritter‘s website 
(used in Loughran and Ritter [2004]). The database is built from a merging of ―Internet 
identifications of Thompson Financial Securities Data, Dealogic, and IPOMonitor.com‖ (p.1).6 
To facilitate comparisons with our SIC industry analysis, we cross-classified the Internet sample 
with our SIC based groupings. The overlap is strongest for computer software, computer 
hardware, and telecommunications industries. However, one other three digit SIC industry (738 – 
Miscellaneous Business Services) accounted for over 10 % of the Internet sample (as of 
3/10/2001). 
 
Table 1 (Panel B) lists the aggregate market capitalizations (as of 1/1/1998, 3/10/2000, and 
12/31/2001) and the number of companies (as of March 10, 2000) for the following groups:  
I. All Internet Companies 
II. Pooled Selected Internet-SIC Industries (II.A + II.B + II.C + II.D) 
 II.A. Internet-Computer Hardware 
                                                 
6
 There is no universally agreed upon definition of an Internet company. The accounting literature has 
relied heavily on the InternetStockList™ (ISL) reported on www.internet.com. The ISL was billed by 
www.internet.com as a complete list of all publicly traded Internet stocks. An Internet stock was 
operationally defined as a stock that existed because of the Internet – that is, had there been no Internet, the 
stock would not be in existence. Papers that use the ISL include Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2000, 2001), 
Demers and Lev (2001), Hand (2001), Bartov, Mohanram and Seethamraju (2002), Davis (2002), Demers 
and Lewellen (2003), Keating, Lys and Magee (2003), and Bauman, Bauman and Das [2010]. Depending 
on whether the authors were targeting all Internet firms or just a subset (e.g., only B2C firms), sample sizes 
these papers analyzed range between 24 and 261. The finance literature approach appears to be to identify 
which new IPOs have an internet connection. The Ritter database has this approach as does Schultz and 
Zaman [2001], Ljungqvist and Wilhem [2003], and Ofek and Richardson [2002, 2003]. The samples in 
these papers ranged from 393 to 538. 
13 
 II.B. Internet-Computer Software 
 II.C. Internet-Telecommunications 
 II.D. Internet-(Miscellaneous) Business Services 
III. All Other Internet Companies (in I. but not in II.) 
The ―All Other Internet Companies‖ group (III) consists of Internet companies from many SIC 
industry groupings. However, no SIC industry group in (III) has more than 4% of the All Internet 
Company group (I).  
 
The Internet sample is dominated by companies that went public after 1995.
7
 In contrast, Sample 
One includes companies of many different IPO and age vintages. The Internet sample is almost 
exclusively traded on NASDAQ. On March 10, 2000, 96.2% of the total companies in Sample 
Two were listed on NASDAQ. The NASDAQ internet companies made up 97.8% of the total 
NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX Internet market capitalization on that date. 
 
IV.C.  Sample Three: Privately-Held Venture-Backed Companies 
Revenues are a pivotal variable for valuing privately-held venture-backed companies. Venture 
capital exists, in part, to finance early-stage companies whose rapid growth aspirations often 
result in their having negative operating cash flow (and often negative income) in their early 
years. Our Sample Three draws on a VentureOne database. VentureOne is a commercial 
organization that collects and sells information about venture-backed companies and their 
investors. The focus is on each company up to the time of an IPO, a trade sale or some other exit. 
For each company included in its database, information on private financing rounds (such as 
dates of funding rounds, amounts raised, and pre-money valuations) as well as details about the 
company‘s management and investors is available. Several financial statement-based numbers 
(revenue and net income) are also included for a subset of these companies. The database is at its 
                                                 
7
 The Internet list includes 4.1% that went IPO prior to 1996. One notable company included in the list is 
Cisco Systems (IPO in 1990). 
14 
most comprehensive from the early 1990‘s onwards. Data are provided to VentureOne by 
companies and their investors on a voluntary basis. Where possible, VentureOne uses additional 
sources to verify the reported numbers (such as obtaining pre-money valuation numbers from the 
company itself, from individual investors, tracking business press reports on the company‘s 
financing, and publicly available regulatory reports such as S-1 filings with the SEC).  
 
VentureOne provides its own industry classifications (16 in total) for the companies in its 
database. The top eight industry classifications cover 86.5% of the 13,765 companies in the 
database. We use these eight industries as our Sample Three, grouping them into five broader 
industries: 
 
I. All Companies in Sample Three 
I.A Software 
I.B Consumer-Business Services 
I.C Communications 
I.D Biopharmaceuticals 
I.E Hardware/Equipment 
 
Table 1 (Panel C) summarizes the composition of these VentureOne industry groups. Of the 
11,910 companies in Table 1 (Panel C), 1,262 had gone IPO by March 2005. We also report the 
number of these IPO companies that were classified as Internet companies using the Sample Two 
Internet company listing (from Jay Ritter‘s website). Approximately 18.9% (or 239 companies) of 
this 1,262 IPO Sample became publicly-listed Internet companies, with most (92.8%) of these 
having their IPO between 1996 and 2000. At the time of their public listing, the majority 
(55.25%) of the Venture One companies with IPO‘s are classified into the six 3-digit SIC code 
industries that comprise our Selected SIC Industry group in Sample One.  
15 
 
 V. Time-Series and Cross-Sectional Distribution of MKT/REV Multiples 
Figure 1 presents time-series plots from 1980-2004 for the MKTt/REVt (the ratio of market 
capitalization of common equity to the most recent annual revenue) multiple for Samples One to 
Three. Each plot has the 90
th
, 70
th
, 50
th
, 30
th
, and 10
th
 percentiles of the annual cross-sectional 
distribution. These percentiles are computed on a year-by-year basis. Sample One has two 
subsamples. Both have similar scales (0 – 100) in Figure 1 to facilitate comparability. The 
Selected SIC Industries subsample was selected based on high market capitalization variation in 
the 1998-2001 period vis-à-vis the All Other Companies subsample. There are dramatic 
MKTt/REVt multiple differences across these two subsamples in Figure 1. The 90
th
 and 70
th
 
percentiles of the Selected SIC Industries subsample are consistently higher than that of the 
comparable deciles for the All Other Companies subsample. The MKTt/REVt plots for Samples 
Two and Three are scaled (0 to 350) higher than for Sample One to reflect the sizably higher 90
th
 
MKTt/REVt percentile values, especially in the 1999 to 2000 period. Specific values for the 90
th
 
percentile across the different samples for selected years are: 
 
 1985 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 
Sample One: NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX         
 Selected SIC Industries 6.6 20.2 18.6 80.3 46.1 27.4 13.9 41.7 
 All Other Companies 5.1 5.1 4.6 5.9 6.1 5.4 4.4 7.2 
Sample Two: Internet Companies - - 85.6 233.1 33.5 9.1 5.5 11.6 
Sample Three: Venture-Backed 
Companies - 78.3 142.5 161.0 332.5 149.8 233.4 100.0 
 
In subsequent sections of this paper, we examine hypotheses that pertain to these time-series or 
cross-sectional differences in MKTt/REVt multiples.
8
 
                                                 
8
 One caveat on the sizably higher levels of the Sample Three MKTt/REVt multiples is that VentureOne 
uses as one of its information sources the S-1 filings of companies attempting to have an IPO. This may 
bias the private company sample to the more successful venture-backed private companies. However, many 
non-IPO exits for such private companies are in trade-sales (acquisitions) for which market competition can 
be intense. See Appendix A of Armstrong, Davila and Foster [2006] for discussion and evidence of 
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VI. Hypothesis One: Company Size and MKT/REV Ratios 
Hypothesis One is that smaller companies have higher MKT/REV ratios. Theoretical valuation 
models often include a growth term. For example, in the classic Miller-Modigliani [1961] 
framework, growth was defined as investments with returns greater than their cost of capital – see 
Fama and Miller [1972]. Much subsequent valuation research has used the Black-Scholes [1973] 
option-theoretic framework to incorporate growth options into equity valuation. Hypothesis One 
rests on smaller companies providing higher growth potential than larger companies. At an 
extreme level, high compound growth rates over extended periods will constrain larger 
companies before smaller companies due to theoretical limits imposed by the size of the market, 
industry or economy in which the company operates. For any innovative product that creates a 
given new market demand, the relative effect on a company‘s revenue or net income will be 
greater for a smaller company than for a larger company. Smaller companies may also encounter 
fewer regulatory obstacles in their early growth strategies.  
 
Figure 2 shows the 90
th
, 70
th
, 50
th
, 30
th
, and 10
th
 percentiles of distribution for the MKT/REV ratio 
for five company size categories. These five categories (in $ millions of revenues) and the 
percentage of observations in each category for the three samples we examine are: 
 
 I 
$0-$5 
II 
$5-$25 
III 
$25-$100 
IV 
$100-$1000 
V 
> $1000 
Sample One: NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX      
 Selected SIC Industries 17.5% 23.7% 24.8% 23.8% 10.2% 
 All Other Companies 10.8% 16.4% 21.6% 34.1% 17.4% 
Sample Two: Internet Companies 10.5% 27.3% 31.7% 26.2% 4.3% 
SampleThree:Venture-Backed Companies 32.8% 40.1% 21.1% 5.9% 0.1% 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
possible biases from a sample that is exclusively comprised of venture-backed private companies that filed 
for an IPO. 
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Not surprisingly, Sample Three (VC-backed private companies) contains the highest percentage 
of observations in each of the two smallest company size categories ($0 - $5 million and $5 - $25 
million in revenue) and the lowest percentage in the largest company size category (> $1,000 
million in revenue). The All Other Companies subsample of Sample One has the lowest 
percentage of observations in the two smallest categories and the highest percentage in the largest 
category. The Selected SIC Industries subsample has 41.2% of observations in the $0 - $25 
million revenue size range compared to 27.2% of observations for the All Other Companies 
subsample of Sample One. 
 
Figure 2 (Panel A) shows the Sample One MKTt/REVt distribution over the 1980 to 2004 period 
for the five company size categories. The vertical MKTt/REVt scalings on the five size categories 
are as follows: $0-$5 million (scale of 0-400); $5-$25 million (0-35); $25-$100 million (0-20); 
$100-$1000 million (0-20); > $1000 million (0-15). The 90
th
 percentile MKTt/REVt value for the 
smallest company group ($0-$5 million) is consistently, over time, higher than the 90
th
 percentile 
MKTt/REVt value of the other four company size categories for both the Selected SIC Industries 
subsample and the All Other Companies subsample. Figure 2 (Panel B) shows company size 
breakdowns for Samples Two and Three. Results are shown only for a subset of years and a 
subset of company size categories due to either zero or minimal observations in some years or 
company size categories. For example, it is only since (approximately) 1996 that a sizable 
number of Internet companies have been publicly listed. Very few VC-backed companies with 
over $100 million of revenues have remained private stand-alone companies. The vertical 
MKTt/REVt scalings in Panel B on the five size categories are $0-$5 million (scale of 0-2,500); 
$5-$25 million (0-300); $25-$100 million (0-120); $100-$1000 million (0-70); > $1000 (0-25). 
The most extreme MKTt/REVt values plotted in Figure 2 (Panel B) are those for the smallest 
company size category for both Samples Two and Three. 
 
In Section IX of this paper we include company size (revenues) as an independent variable in a 
multivariate regression analysis with MKTt/REVt as the dependent variable. The company size 
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variable consistently has a negative coefficient that is highly statistically significant across all 
samples examined. In the next section of this paper we explore the recent revenue growth 
hypothesis and highlight how company size also is central to understanding the relative effect of 
recent revenue growth on MKT/REV ratios.  
 
VII. Hypothesis Two: Recent Revenue Growth and MKT/REV Ratios 
Hypothesis Two is that companies with higher recent positive revenue growth rates will have 
higher MKTt/REVt ratios than companies with lower recent positive revenue growth rates. Its 
rationale is that the most recent revenue growth is a value-relevant predictor of future revenue 
growth or other value-relevant variables. The early literature on the time-series properties of 
accounting numbers focused on earnings. The key conclusion from multiple studies was that the 
first differenced earnings series was either serially uncorrelated or in some studies exhibited 
statistically significant negative serial correlation – see, for example, Ball and Watts [1972].9 In 
contrast, the revenue series shows statistically significant evidence of positive serial correlation. 
We computed autocorrelations for lags 1 to 4 for the first differenced annual revenue series for 
companies in our two groups for Sample One.
10
 The time-period is 1980 to 2004. Table 2 shows 
the results. For comparison purposes, we also report results for the operating income series and 
the income before extraordinary items series. The Selected SIC Industries group in Sample One 
has over 20,000 observations while the All Other Industries group has over 90,000 observations. 
Table 2 highlights the statistically significant evidence of positive autocorrelation for the first 
differenced annual revenue series for both Sample One groups. Moreover, the Selected SIC 
Industries group (r1=0.36; r2=0.18; r3=0.16; r4=0.17) shows stronger positive autocorrelations than 
the All Other Companies group (r1=0.18; r2=0.02; r3=0.07; r4=0.09). The positive autocorrelations 
for revenues in Table 2 contrasts sharply with the minimal to negative autocorrelations for both 
the operating income series and the income before extraordinary items series.  
 
                                                 
9
 Ball and Foster [1982] and Foster [1986, pp. 238-245], provide reviews of this early literature. 
10
 Samples Two and Three have too limited a time-series for individual companies to compute comparable 
autocorrelations. 
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We now explore further evidence pertaining to our Hypothesis Two – companies with higher 
recent positive revenue growth rates will have higher MKTt/REVt ratios. In Section IX we present 
multivariate regression results that strongly support this hypothesis. This section of our paper 
highlights key factors that warrant recognition in quantifying the importance of past revenue 
growth in MKT/REV analysis. Annual revenue growth is computed as 
(
        
          
  )       
For a subset of observations there is information for revenuet, but not for revenuet-1 in our 
databases. For Samples One and Two, this is primarily due to newly-listed companies. Sample 
Three has a subset of missing observations due to the VentureOne data not always having a full 
sequence of annual revenue numbers. Note that where the private company in Sample Three 
starts in year t, there is no year t-1 annual revenue number by definition. The percentage of 
observations that fall in the positive revenue growth (or no change), negative revenue growth, and 
missing observations categories are: 
 Positive 
Revenue 
Change 
Negative 
Revenue 
Change 
Missing 
Observation Total 
Sample One: NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX Companies     
 Selected SIC Industries 58.2% 28.7% 13.1% 100.0% 
 All Other Companies 62.6% 27.6% 9.8% 100.0% 
Sample Two: Internet Companies 48.3% 26.1% 25.6% 100.0% 
Sample Three: Venture-Backed Companies 61.9% 7.2% 30.9% 100.0% 
 
The ―missing observation‖ category appears to be not a random sample and is of considerable 
interest in any study on market-to-revenue multiples or revenue growth. 
 
A. Annual Revenue Growth Rates, Industry/Sector, and Time Period 
Cross-sectional distributions of the annual revenue growth rate from 1980 to 2004 are presented 
in Figure 3 for the Selected SIC Industries (Panel A) and All Other Companies (Panel B) 
subsamples of Sample One. Several patterns are observable in Figure 3. First, the 90
th
 percentile 
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for the Selected SIC Industries group consistently exceeds the 90
th
 percentile for the All Other 
Companies Group over the 1980-2004 period. The Selected SIC Industries has consistently had 
higher revenue growth in the upper tail of its distribution. Second, there is consistently larger 
revenue growth variability for the Selected SIC Industries group than the All Other Companies 
group. One measure of variability in revenue growth is the 90
th
 to 10
th
 interpercentile range. Panel 
C in Figure 3 plots this interpercentile range for the two groups over the 1980 to 2004 period. For 
1999 and 2000, the interpercentile range had values of 266% and 305%, respectively, which is 
well above the range outside of the 1998-2000 period. Every year from 1980 to 2004, the 
interpercentile range for the Selected SIC Industries is larger. Recall that the industries in the two 
subsamples were chosen using only 1998-2001 information. The results in Figure 3 and 
Appendix A highlight how the Selected SIC Industries exhibited higher variability and higher risk 
in both capital market and fundamental measures long before the 1998-2001 period.
11
 
 
The MKTt/REVt multiples in Figure 1 for Sample Two (the Internet Sector) typically exceed 
those for the Selected SIC Industries in Figure 1 for comparable years. Figure 4 presents annual 
revenue growth rates for the 90
th
, 70
th
, and 10
th
 percentiles that highlight that Sample Two, 
likewise has higher revenue growth rates vis-à-vis Sample One for the 90
th
 and 70
th
 percentiles, 
especially in the 1998 to 2000 years. The magnitude of the 90
th
 and 70
th
 percentiles for the 
Internet companies (i.e., Sample Two) during 1998 to 2000 are well above either of the two 
Sample One subgroups for comparable years and well above historical revenue growth rates for 
the Sample One subgroups before the advent of Internet companies.  
 
                                                 
11
 The higher risk Selected SIC Industries subsample had dramatically higher positive security returns in 
the 1998-2000 period. Capital market theory would predict that these companies would also have 
dramatically more negative security returns in the event of a market decline. This is exactly what happened 
by December 2001. Table 1 shows the following aggregate market capitalizations (in $ billions): 
 1/1/1998 3/10/2000 12/31/2001 
Selected SIC Industries $2,849 $9,262 $4,593 
All Other Companies $8,202 $9,135 $9,619 
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Figure 4 also plots annual revenue growth rate deciles for the privately-held venture-backed 
companies (Sample Three). The vertical scales for Samples One and Two in Figure 4 are identical 
(90
th
 percentile: scale of 0-800%; 70
th
 percentile: 0-300%) to visually highlight the higher annual 
revenue growth for the Internet Companies vs. the Selected SIC Industries and for the Selected 
SIC Industries vs. All Other Companies. Sample Three is scaled differently (90
th
 percentile: scale 
of 0-2,000%; 70
th
 percentile: 0-500%) to avoid differences across other samples being visually 
diminished by the extreme revenue growth rates for the venture-backed private companies. 
Sample Three has even higher annual revenue growth rates than either Samples One or Two. 
Note also the dramatic declines in annual revenue growth rates in Figure 4 for the Selected SIC 
Industries (in 2001), the Internet companies (in 2001), and the venture-backed companies (in 
2002 and 2003). 
 
Table 3 shows the distribution (10
th
, 20
th, …, 80th, 90th percentiles) of revenue growth rates for 
our five different size company categories and for the pooled sample. The data in Table 3 
highlights how smaller companies have both higher negative revenue growth rates (see 
the 10
th
 and 20
th
 percentiles) and higher positive revenue growth rates (see the 80
th
 and 
90
th
 percentiles).  
 
B. MKT/REV Multiples and Sign/Size of Revenue Growth Rates 
Other things being equal, it is expected that the capital market favorably values companies with 
positive recent revenue growth vis-à-vis companies with negative revenue growth. Table 4 
reports distribution statistics (10
th
 percentile, 50
th
 percentile, 90
th
 percentile) for the MKTt/REVt 
multiple for three mutually exclusive groups: 
A.) Companies with positive or zero reported revenue growth in the most recent year, 
B.) Companies with negative reported revenue growth in the most recent year, and 
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C.) Companies without the prior or current year‘s reported revenue number in the 
database with which to compute a revenue growth rate (typically, these are newly-
listed companies in Samples One and Two
12
) 
These three groups do not appear to have similar MKTt/REVt distributions, especially in their 
upper tails. The groups with the highest MKTt/REVt observations in their upper tails are typically 
those in either the negative revenue growth group or the missing revenue growth group. This is 
counter to the expectation noted above.  
 
Consider the MKTt/REVt distribution comparison between the negative revenue growth group 
and the positive revenue growth group. The ratio of the 90
th
 MKTt/REVt percentile of the 
negative revenue growth group to the 90
th
 MKTt/REVt percentile of the positive revenue growth 
group exceeds one for most years. Summary data for this ratio are: 
 
Time Period 
Average 
Ratio 
# Years with 
Ratio > 1 
Sample One: NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX    
 Selected SIC Industries 1980-2004 2.36 22/25 
 All Other Companies 1980-2004 1.58 22/25 
Sample Two: Internet Companies 1997-2004 5.26 3/8 
SampleThree:Venture-Backed Companies 1992-2004 31.87 13/13 
 
For Samples One and Three, there is a consistent pattern for the 90
th
 MKTt/REVt percentile for 
the negative revenue growth group exceeding that of the positive revenue growth group. The 
pattern for Sample Two (Internet companies) is less consistent. While the mean ratio of 5.26 is 
greater than 1, it is heavily impacted by the 1995 observation where the 90
th
 percentile is 2,101.6. 
The MKTt/REVt distribution for the missing revenue observation sample is typically even more 
positively skewed than the other two groups in Table 4.  
                                                 
12
 For companies in Sample Three, there is occasionally a missing current year‘s reported revenue number 
due to the absence of a regulatory mandate for private companies to publicly disclose financial data. 
VentureOne relies in part on voluntary disclosure by private companies in their financial data bases and 
also on regulatory disclosures. (S-1 filings associated with an IPO are a key data source. These S-1 filings 
can be used to ―back-fill‖ numbers not previously publicly disclosed.) 
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Hypothesis Three explores the potential role of transitory revenue in explaining the extreme 
positive skewness in MKTt/REVt ratios for the negative revenue growth subsample in Table 4.  
 
VIII. Hypothesis Three: Transitory Revenue and MKT/REV Ratios 
Hypothesis Three is that companies with negative revenue growth and higher MKTt/REVt ratios 
have a higher likelihood of negative transitory revenue. The concept of transitory revenue is a 
potential explanation for the Table 4 counter-intuitive result that the median and upper percentiles 
of the MKT/REV ratio of companies with negative revenue growth exceed those with positive 
revenue growth.  
 
 
Transitory revenue is linked to reported revenue and underlying revenue as follows: 
 
Reported 
Revenue 
= 
Underlying 
Revenue 
+ 
Transitory 
Revenue 
 
Reported revenue is what each company reports in its financial statements. We compute 
MKT/REV as market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year end divided by the reported 
revenue for that fiscal year. Underlying revenue is the (unobservable) variable that the capital 
market perceives as relevant to capturing the ongoing revenue generating capacity of a company 
in a given period. Transitory revenue are components that are noise in inferring underlying 
revenue from reported revenue.
13
 Examples of components include random and ―one-off‖ events, 
activities by management to shift/misrepresent reported revenues across periods, and the revenues 
that result from using accounting methods not viewed as appropriate by the capital market. 
 
Revenue Growth Transition Matrix Analysis 
                                                 
13
 Beaver and Morse [1978], Beaver [1989, pp. 91-101], and Foster [1986, pp. 436-443] provide further 
discussion of the ―transitory‖ vs. ―permanent‖ distinction with respect to reported earnings.  
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Insight into the role of transitory revenue can be gained by examining the multi-year behavior of 
revenue growth from portfolios formed using MKTt/REVt for (a) positive revenue growth 
observations, (b) negative revenue growth observations, and (c) missing observations. We use 
several steps to construct a transition matrix: 
1.) For all of the observations in year t, compute and rank the year t revenue growth (t/t-
1) for those observations with available information. Form 10 equally-sized 
portfolios. Portfolio 1 has the lowest (starting with the most negative) revenue 
growth rate and Portfolio 10 has the highest (finishing with the most positive). An 
11
th
 portfolio of observations with missing revenue growth in year t is also formed 
2.) For each of the ten portfolios from step 1, compute and rank the year t+1 revenue 
growth (t+1/t) and form 10 equally-sized portfolios.  
 
Table 5 presents the results in a percentage of observations format for the transition matrix. Under 
the null hypotheses of no association across years in revenue growth, each cell in the 10 x 10 
matrix is expected to have the same percentage of observations. Three patterns observable in 
Table 5 are: 
1.) The revenue ―momentum‖ corner portfolios in Table 4 – [1,1] for successive years of lowest 
growth and [10,10] for successive years of highest growth – have higher than expected 
percentages: 
 Portfolio 1,t/ 
Portfolio 1,t+1 
Portfolio 10,t/ 
Portfolio 10,t+1 
Sample One: NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX   
 Selected SIC Industries 27.42% 37.87% 
 All Other Companies 29.60% 34.93% 
Sample Two: Internet Companies 26.67% 41.82% 
SampleThree:Venture-Backed Companies 21.15% 36.59% 
 
Momentum in the [10,10] corner is consistent with economic factors giving current high revenue 
growth companies a sustaining advantage over multiple years (e.g., due to, say, superior 
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branding, exclusive patents, deeper customer relationships, or a sustainable low-cost advantage). 
Here, above average revenue growth t/t-1 is likely to indicate above average revenue growth in 
t+1/t. Momentum in the [1,1] corner is consistent with the factors giving rise to revenue decline 
(e.g., poor quality problems, inexperienced management repeatedly incurring self-inflicted 
wounds, or aggregate market declining due to a disruptive technology) persisting over multiple 
years. 
 
2.) The ―reversal‖ corner portfolios in Table 5 – [1,10] and [10,1] – have above expected 
percentages for both corners of the Sample One transition matrix, for neither of the reversal 
corners for the Sample Two matrix, and only the [Port 1, t; Port 10, t+1] corner for Sample Three: 
 Portfolio 1,t/ 
Portfolio 10,t+1 
Portfolio 10,t/ 
Portfolio 1,t+1 
Sample One: NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX   
 Selected SIC Industries 17.95% 14.37% 
 All Other Companies 16.10% 13.99% 
Sample Two: Internet Companies 6.06% 5.45% 
SampleThree:Venture-Backed Companies 13.94%  5.23% 
 
Above average ―reversal‖ is consistent with transitory revenue growth being a sizable component 
of reported revenue growth for some companies. For Samples One and Three, the [Port 1, t; Port 
10, t+1] combination is above average. Negative transitory revenue growth in year t will likely 
result in an annual revenue growth in year t+1 that is above average (due to the ―abnormally‖ low 
year t reported revenue in the numerator of year t and the denominator in year t+1).  
3.) Table 5 shows the row percentages for those observations with a missing revenue number in 
the REVt/REVt-1 computation. Using the portfolio cutoff points for year t+1 we classify those 
observations into one of the ten REVt+1/REVt portfolios.
14
 The percentage membership of the ten 
                                                 
14
 Specifically, for each Sample of companies, we form ten equally sized portfolios based on the 
observation‘s revenue growth from year t to year t+1 (excluding the missing revenue growth observations). 
We then use the lowest and highest revenue growth for each portfolio to establish the revenue growth range 
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revenue growth portfolios in year t+1 indicate that the year t subsample with missing 
observations has a disproportionately higher percentage in the higher revenue growth portfolios in 
year t+1. For example, the combined percentages in portfolios 9 and 10 are: Sample One – 
Selected SIC Industries (52.99%); Sample One – All Other Companies (45.32%); Sample Two – 
Internet Companies (56.09%); and Sample Three – Venture-backed Companies (43.81%). One 
explanation for Sample One and Two is that the newly-listed IPO companies include those from 
Sample Three. Figure 4 documents the quantumly higher revenue growth rates in the private 
company sample. 
 
Multi-Year Analysis of MKT/REV Portfolios With Different Sign of Annual Revenue 
Growth 
Across each of the three samples, there is a positive revenue growth expectation. For instance, the 
median annual revenue growth rates are: Sample One – Selected SIC Industries (11.4%); Sample 
One – All Other Companies (8.4%); Sample Two – Internet Companies (47.1%); and Sample 
Three – Venture-backed Companies (56.0%). Hypothesis Three is that companies with reported 
negative revenue growth will likely include a subset where the current reported revenue number 
includes a sizable negative transitory component. We now examine whether the capital market 
sets MKTt/REVt multiples recognizing this negative transitory component in an empirically 
observable way. We first examine the sample with positive revenue growth observations, in part 
to use it as a benchmark to interpret the sample with negative revenue growth observations. 
 
Figure 5 (Panel A) shows the median company revenue growth rates for ten portfolios ranked on 
the basis of their MKTt/REVt values; Panel A is based only on observations with positive revenue 
growth in year t. These ten portfolios comprise the top 10%, next 10%, …, bottom 10% of 
MKTt/REVt observations for each company/year combination. By construction, they range from 
                                                                                                                                                 
of each of the ten portfolios. The observations with missing revenue growth from year t-1 to year t are then 
assigned to one of the ten portfolios based on their revenue growth from year t to year t+1. We report these 
assignments in Table 5. 
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the highest to the lowest MKTt/REVt observations. However, this does not mechanically rank the 
portfolios on the basis of revenue growth. Table 6 reports the correlation between the median 
MKTt/REVt multiple of each portfolio and its median annual revenue growth. The analysis is 
conducted for the annual revenue growth at year t, year t+1, and year t+2 for the ten portfolios 
constructed in year t. For the subsample of observations with positive revenue growth in the year 
the MKTt/REVt multiple is computed (i.e., year t), there is a significant positive correlation at the 
portfolio level between MKTt/REVt and annual revenue growth in each of years 1, 2, and 3 for 
Samples One (both Selected SIC Industries and All Other Companies) and for Sample Three. The 
Internet sample has significant positive correlations in years 1 and 2, but not in year 3. A word of 
caution is appropriate in interpreting the Internet sample results. The analysis in Figure 5 is 
conducted in event time (rather than calendar time). The sample with the least diversification in 
constructing multiple sequences of calendar time to package in event time is the Internet sample. 
The Internet sample is heavily concentrated in the 1997 to 2002 period and exhibits the most 
precipitous drop in annual revenue growth in 2000 and beyond (see Figure 4). In contrast, 
Samples One and Three have longer time sequences to effect the time period diversification.  
 
The general finding from Figure 5 (Panel A) is that the capital market sets higher MKTt/REVt 
multiples for companies with positive revenue growth not only in year t, but also with the realized 
growth rates in years t+1 and t+2. For the observations with positive annual revenue growth, there 
is support for both the sign and magnitude of past revenue growth as well as subsequent realized 
revenue growth being positively associated with MKTt/REVt multiples.  
 
Figure 5 (Panel B) and Table 5 both report results for those observations with negative revenue 
growth. There is a key dramatic difference from the positive revenue growth observations in 
Figure 5 (Panel A). In the year the ten MKTt/REVt portfolios are formed (i.e., year t), there is a 
high negative correlation between the median MKTt/REVt in year t of each portfolio and the 
magnitude of the revenue growth in year t. This significant negative correlation supports the 
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hypothesis that reported revenue in year t includes a negative transitory revenue component that 
the capital market takes into account. The more negative the transitory revenue component, the 
lower the denominator of the MKTt/REVt computation. Hypothesis Three can be empirically 
probed by observing the realized annual revenue growth rates in years t+1 and t+2 for the ten 
portfolios in Panel B. The revenue growth rates in years t+1 and t+2 are positively correlated with 
the MKTt/REVt multiples. This flipping of the sign and magnitude of the portfolio revenue 
growth rates between year t and year t+1 in Panel B is most marked for Samples One and Three. 
Our results are consistent with Hypothesis Three – the capital market sets MKTt/REVt multiples 
such that the magnitude of transitory revenue is recognized; higher MKTt/REVt multiples are 
assigned to those negative Year t revenue growth companies with higher realized (and 
presumably expected) annual revenue growth in years t+1 and t+2. 
 
Table 6 shows results for: (a) the correlations between median MKTt/REVt and median annual 
revenue growth in years t, t+1, and t+2 (in Panel A), and (b) the correlations between median 
annual revenue growth of the ten MKTt/REVt portfolios for pairs of years t, t+1, and t+2 (in Panel 
B). The correlations in Panel B highlight the revenue momentum factor for the positive revenue 
growth subsample. It is the strongest in samples One and Three. The Internet companies in 
Sample Two exhibit significant evidence of revenue momentum between years t and t+1, but 
none between years t and t+2 or between years t+1 and t+2. The results for the negative revenue 
growth portfolios in Panel B highlight the reversal pattern associated with the negative transitory 
revenue component in year t. Note also the positive correlations between the median annual 
revenue growth rates across portfolios between years t+1 and t+2 (with the Internet sample 
having the lowest positive correlation). Portfolios formed on MKTt/REVt in year t for a sample 
with negative revenue growth have positive Pearson correlations between median annual revenue 
growth rates in years t+1 and years t+2 of 0.98 (Sample One – Selected SIC), 0.95 (Sample One – 
All Other), 0.45 (Sample Two – Internet), and 0.90 (Sample Three – Venture-backed). This is 
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strong support for our negative transitory revenue hypothesis for the MKTt/REVt multiples of 
negative revenue growth companies in year t.  
 
 
IX. Multivariate Analysis 
This section incorporates our prior analysis into a multivariate framework. Table 7 presents rank 
regression results that further probe the three hypotheses for our three samples. We present results 
for rank regressions due to the extreme observations found in each of the three samples: 
Dependent Variable MKTt/REVt 
Independent Variables  
Company Size log(REVt) 
Current Revenue Growth [(REVt/REVt-1) – 1] 
Future Revenue Growth [(REVt+1/REVt) – 1] 
Profitability 
Income/Revenue if > 0 
Neg. Income/Revenue if ≤ 0 
Leverage 
Long-term debt 
 Total assets 
1998-2000 Time Period Indicator = 1 if 1998-2000 
 
Table 7 reports results for the regression with combinations of independent variables. Regression 
#1 reports results that pertain to Hypothesis One which predicts a negative relationship between 
MKTt/REVt and company size. Across each of the samples for Regression #1, this hypothesis is 
strongly supported. Hypothesis Two – companies with higher positive current revenue growth 
will have higher MKTt/REVt – is consistently supported by the Regression 2 results. 
Regressions 3 to 5 combine variables related to company size, current revenue growth, and future 
revenue growth (defined as the realized revenue growth in Year t+1/Year t). The future revenue 
growth variable is added in Regressions 3b, 4 and 5 to recognize that the capital market uses a 
broad based information set when forecasting future revenue growth. Both the current revenue 
growth and the future revenue growth measures are expected to have measurement error 
regarding capturing the expected revenue growth implicit in MKTt/REVt. The current revenue 
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growth variable (REVt/REVt-1) will incorporate factors affecting Year t but not expected to affect 
subsequent years. The future revenue growth variable (REVt+1/REVt-1) will incorporate factors 
affecting Year t+1 that were unanticipated at the end of Year t. Both measures also are scalars 
(representing one year of revenue growth) whereas the capital market likely is impounding a 
vector (representing revenue growth over a sequence of future years). The regression results in 
Regressions 1 to 5 consistently support Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
 
Existing textbooks emphasize the importance of profitability in capital market valuation – see, for 
example, Palepu and Healy [2007] and Penman [2009]. Regression #6 reports regression results 
for MKTt/REVt as the dependent variable and two related profitability independent variables: 
 INC/REV (Net Income/Revenues) – if net income is positive or zero 
 NEGINC/REV (Negative Net Income/Revenues) 
We include these two separate profitability variables due to prior research documenting 
―anomalous‖ results for the loss company observations. 15 Results are reported for the two 
publicly traded company samples; the VentureOne database has limited net income observations 
for the privately held Sample Three companies. For both Sample One subsamples the coefficients 
on the two profitability variables are positive and statistically significant – the more profitable the 
company, the higher the MKTt/REVt multiple. However, the internet companies show 
insignificant coefficients on the two profitability variables in Regression #6.  
 
Regression #7 pools the independent variables in Regression #1 to #6. We also include two 
additional variables: 
 Financial leverage (long-term debt to total assets) 
 1998-2000 time period intercept dummy variable 
The rank regressions in Regression #7 provide strong support for Hypotheses One and Two in a 
multivariate context.  
                                                 
15
 Collins, Pincus and Xie [1999] report results showing an ―anomalous significantly negative price-
earnings relation using the simple earnings capitalization model for firms that report losses‖ (p.29). 
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Sample Two (internet companies) alone has several changes in the sign or significance of 
individual independent variables for Regression #7 vis-à-vis Regressions #1 to #6. In Regression 
#7, the coefficient on the future revenue growth for Sample Two is positive and significant 
whereas the coefficient on the current revenue growth is positive but insignificant; both growth 
variables are positive and significant in Regression #4 and #5. Regression #7 reports significant 
positive coefficients on the two profitability variables for Sample Two whereas they were 
insignificantly negative in Regression #6.  
 
A comparison of the R
2‘s across selected regressions provides additional insight into the differing 
significance of the company size, revenue growth, and profitability variables. We successively 
use the Adjusted R
2‘s in Regression #1 (company size), #4 (revenue growth), and #6 
(profitability) as the numerator and the Adjusted R
2
 in Regression #7 as the denominator:
16
 
 Sample One Sample Two 
Internet 
Companies 
Sample Three 
VC-Backed 
Private Companies 
Selected SIC 
Industries 
All Other 
Companies 
Company Size 
(#1 / #7) 
8.2% 
36.9% 
 
= 22.2% 
 
9.5% 
43.6% 
 
= 21.8% 
 
7.1% 
40.1% 
 
= 17.7% 
 
68.1% 
67.2% 
 
= 101.3% 
 
Revenue Growth 
(#4 / #7) 
11.1% 
36.9% 
 
= 30.1% 
 
6.0% 
43.6% 
 
= 13.8% 
 
35.7% 
40.1% 
 
= 89.0% 
 
20.9% 
67.2% 
 
= 31.1% 
 
Profitability 
(#6 / #7) 
15.7% 
36.9% 
 
= 42.5% 
 
30.2% 
43.6% 
 
= 69.3% 
 
4.3% 
40.1% 
 
= 10.7% 
 
- 
 
For the two Sample One subgroups of companies, profitability variables contribute the most 
explanatory power. Revenue growth is more important for the Selected SIC Industries than for 
the All Other Companies; the R
2 
for revenue growth variables in Regression #4 are 30.1% of the 
Regression #7 R
2
 for the Selected SIC Industries subsample, but only 13.8% for the All Other 
Companies subsample. Revenue growth is the dominant contributor for Sample Two (Internet 
                                                 
16
 Due to possible collinearity among the company size, revenue growth, and profitability variables, the 
sum of these percentages may overstate the combined explanatory power of these variables in a 
multivariate context.  
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Companies) while company size is the dominant contributor for Sample Three (venture-backed 
private companies).  
 
Table 8 reports for Sample One rank regressions for the (a) positive revenue growth, (b) negative 
revenue growth, and (c) missing revenue growth observation subsamples in panels A through C, 
respectively. The positive revenue growth subsample is the largest subsample and has results 
similar to Regression #7 in Table 7. The negative revenue growth subsample has a sign reversal 
on the two revenue growth independent variables – the coefficient on current revenue growth is 
significantly negative while the coefficient on future revenue growth is significantly positive. 
These results support Hypothesis Three and are consistent with the ―flipping‖ of the portfolio 
revenue growth rates in Year t and Year t+1 in Figure 5 (Panel B). The missing observations 
subsample has (by definition) no current revenue growth independent variable; the coefficient on 
the future revenue growth variable is significantly positive.  
 
The multivariate results in Tables 7 and 8 reinforce the findings reported in prior sections. 
Revenue growth and company size are key determinants of MKTt/REVt multiples. Moreover, the 
capital market is able to distinguish (in a probabilistic sense) cases where both current and future 
revenue growth are positively correlated from cases where they are negatively correlated. 
 
 
X. Overview and Extensions Of Research 
Our findings have implications for research in at least four areas – capital market valuation, 
―management‖ of reported financial numbers, analysis of the 1998-2000 capital market ―bubble 
era‖, and early-stage company valuation and growth.  
 
Capital Market Valuation Research 
33 
Prior capital market research has recognized that deleting observations with negative net income 
or negative book value results in samples under-represented in: 
a.) high-technology companies, and 
b.) younger early-stage companies 
The samples examined in this paper include a broad cross-section of (a) and (b) companies as 
well as companies from other industries and in their post early-stages. We document several 
marked features of (a) and (b) companies. Such companies typically have higher revenue growth 
rates, higher variability in revenue growth rates, and a higher negative income likelihood. The 
strong support for our Hypothesis One (negative association between MKTt/REVt and company 
size) and Hypothesis Two (positive association between MKTt/REVt and recent positive revenue 
growth) highlights the importance of recognizing company size and revenue growth variables in 
company valuation research. Note, moreover, that these variables are also highly statistically 
significant in a broad sample of non-high technology publicly traded companies (Sample One – 
All Other Companies).  
 
Our analysis is of increased interest in the post-―internet bubble‖ period given the continued high 
profile valuation of select individual early-stage companies e.g., Facebook (2004/2005 startup), 
Zynga (2007 startup), and Groupon (2008 startup). 
 
Management of Reported Financial Numbers Research 
The earnings management literature hypothesizes that management proactively uses accounting 
rules (such as revenue or expense recognition) to change reported accounting numbers. One 
explanation for a transitory component in reported numbers is management accounting 
―adjustments‖ for reasons related to misrepresenting underlying economics e.g., changing 
software revenue recognition assumptions to maximize a compensation bonus or an earn-out 
provision. However, other explanations (of a non-management manipulation kind) for the 
transitory component exist – e.g., a negative transitory revenue component could be due to a 
delay in a recurring computer hardware sales shipment cycle due to an unexpected shortage of 
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component parts. In some cases, a negative transitory revenue component in Year t may well 
result in a positive transitory revenue component in Year t+1. Research on ways to better identify 
contexts where transitory revenue is sizable (and their possible explanations) can assist the 
probing of earnings ―management‖ hypotheses. The research in this paper used the joint 
combination of (i) a high MKTt/REVt multiple, and (ii) a negative current revenue growth to 
identify negative transitory revenue contexts. Alternative combinations of MKTt/REVt levels and 
revenue growth rates could potentially be used to identify positive transitory revenue contexts. 
Note that a key assumption here is that the capital market is able to identify (in a relatively high 
probabilistic sense) this transitory component when setting MKTt/REVt multiples.  
 
Analysis of 1998-2000 Capital Market “Bubble Era” 
The working assumption in many descriptions of the 1998-2000 capital market period is that 
company fundamentals did not explain the historically high levels of market multiples. Our 
research looks at both the pre and post behavior of revenue growth and documents their dramatic 
decline in 2000/2001 vis-à-vis 1998-2000. We document that industries with the largest 
increases/decreases in market capitalization in the 1998-2001 period had characteristics that 
identified them as relatively high risk for an extended period prior to 1998 e.g., higher beta, 
higher standard deviation of security returns, and higher percentage of negative net income. Our 
results are consistent with capital markets behaving more rationally along the predictions of 
capital market theory than many observers are willing to recognize.  
 
Our results also highlight that the capital market 1998-2000 surge and subsequent decline in 
valuations was not restricted to the so-called internet companies that have been the focus of many 
research studies. While internet companies exhibited very high positive (negative) rates of returns 
in the 1998-2000 (2000-2001) period, the dollar amount of their aggregate market capitalization 
increase/decrease is dwarfed by the aggregate increase/decrease in market capitalization of our 
Selected SIC Industries group, which comprise the broader computer 
software/hardware/telecommunications/biotech-pharmaceuticals sectors. Aggregate market 
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capitalizations of our Selected SIC Industries group and the Internet Companies are (from Table 1 
- $ billions
17
):  
 Selected SIC 
Industries 
Internet 
Companies 
Selected SIC Industries 
Excluding Overlapping 
Internet Companies 
Aggregate Market Capitalizations 
1/1/1998 
3/10/2000 
12/31/2001 
 
$ 2,489 
9,262 
4,593 
 
$ 80 
1,630 
279 
 
$ 2,412 
7,762 
4,337 
Aggregate Changes 
1/1/1998 – 3/10/2000 
3/10/2000 – 12/31/2001 
 
$ 6,773  
 4,669  
 
$ 1,550  
1,351  
 
$ 5,350 
3,425 
 
Research probing the 1998-2001 capital market era needs to examine a broader set of companies 
than just those labeled as ―internet stocks‖.  Most internet companies were listed on NASDAQ. 
Many of the companies in our Selected SIC Industries group were listed on the NYSE. The above 
market capitalization changes highlight that the so-called ―internet bubble‖ is an overly narrow 
description. The increases/decreases in market capitalization in the 1998-2001 period occurred for 
many non-internet companies and for many non-NASDAQ companies.  
 
Early-Stage Company Research 
Our research documents that both company size and revenue growth are statistically significant 
independent variables in MKTt/REVt models in both public and private markets. We also find the 
dramatically higher revenue growth rates for our venture-backed private companies sample 
(Sample Three) vis-à-vis the revenue growth rates for the publicly traded company samples 
(Samples One and Two) – see Figure 4. Not all early-stage companies are venture capital backed. 
Venture capitalists traditionally restrict themselves to companies that both address large markets 
and have the capacity to grow rapidly. The revenue growth rates we report in Figure 4 and Table 
4 are consistent with multiple early-stage private companies achieving revenue growth rates not 
accomplished by many publicly-traded companies. Subsequent research could examine the 
growth rates on non-venture financed private companies. Such analysis could be part of a broader 
focus on factors that explain the level and change in revenue growth rates as a company evolves 
                                                 
17
 Table 1 reports the extent to which our Selected SIC Industries and Internet Companies overlap. 
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over time. Our research highlights that the existence of venture capital financing likely is a 
facilitator of high revenue growth. Other potential variables that could be examined include the 
product/service markets targeted by a company and the experience/aspirations of the management 
team. 
 
The growing analysis of early-stage companies offers many avenues to analyze how key factors 
affect company valuation and growth e.g., the type of private financing, the role of public listing, 
the chosen business model and its ability to scale, and the adoption of management control 
systems. The dramatic time-series and cross-sectional variations in both the capital market 
variables and the fundamental accounting variables across both the public and private company 
samples examined in this paper highlight the fruitful opportunities for subsequent research.  
 
 Early-stage companies are also of much interest due to many having a relatively high intangible 
asset composition vis-à-vis tangible assets. Venture capital funding often occurs because 
companies have negative net cash flows due to their making ―investments‖ in intangibles such as 
technologies, discoveries, etc. or the buildup of a sales/marketing capability. Revenues are an 
important signal that such ―investments‖ are being commercially valued by customers or partners. 
Rapid growth in revenues potentially is a lead indicator of subsequent growth in profitability. An 
important research area is understanding the strength, time-horizon and determinants of such 
lead/lag relationships between revenue growth and profitability growth.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Risk Differences Across NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Subsamples of Listed Companies 
 
The Selected SIC Industries and All Other Companies subsamples of Sample One exhibit sizable 
differences in risk-related indicators prior to and after, as well as during, the 1998 – 2001 period.  
 
Capital Market Risk: Two frequently used measures of a company‘s capital market risk are the 
CAPM beta and the standard deviation of security returns. The Selected SIC Industries group has 
had higher relative market risk and higher total market risk than the All Other Companies group 
for an extended time period since the 1980‘s through to 2004: 
 
 
Beta Standard Deviation of Returns 
Selected SIC 
Industries 
All Other 
Companies 
Selected SIC 
Industries 
All Other 
Companies 
Year 90
th
 50
th
 90
th
 50
th
 90
th
 50
th
 90
th
 50
th
 
1980 1.87 1.08 1.54 0.70 0.044 0.029 0.042 0.024 
1985 2.15 0.87 1.42 0.55 0.041 0.022 0.036 0.018 
1990 1.77 0.68 1.36 0.42 0.072 0.029 0.055 0.021 
1995 2.09 0.75 1.33 0.35 0.053 0.024 0.037 0.016 
2000 1.71 0.86 1.08 0.24 0.086 0.040 0.054 0.025 
2004 2.14 1.17 1.63 0.71 0.049 0.023 0.031 0.014 
 
These data highlight that before, during, and after the 1998-2001 period, our Selected SIC 
Industry group had sizably higher market relative risk and higher market total risk than our All 
Other Companies group. With this higher risk, finance theory would predict came the potential 
for larger increases in market capitalization and larger decreases in market capitalization.  
 
Negative Net Income: A fundamental indicator of company risk is the likelihood of reporting a 
loss. All else held equal, a firm with negative net income is less likely to generate funds for 
investing in new growth opportunities or to make distributions to its shareholders. The Selected 
SIC Industries group differs markedly from the All Other Companies group in terms of its 
propensity for losses. While there has been an increase since 1980 in the percentage of all 
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companies reporting negative net income (with a decline in the 2002 to 2004 period), this 
increase has been concentrated in our Selected SIC Industries group:  
 
Year 
Selected 
SIC Industries 
All Other 
Industries 
All Companies 
Pooled 
1980 7.8% 23.5% 21.5% 
1985 30.3% 16.3% 18.5% 
1990 37.2% 23.1% 25.6% 
1995 39.1% 17.2% 21.9% 
2000 56.8% 22.3% 31.0% 
2001 68.0% 25.3% 36.0% 
2004 50.3% 22.7% 29.4% 
 
The results for the All Companies column have been noted before by Hayn [1995], Collins, 
Pincus, and Xie [1999], and Joos and Plesko [2005]. Over time, the likelihood that a publicly-
traded U.S. listed company will report a loss has increased. In 1980, there was roughly a 20% 
chance in any one year, while by 2000 there was more than a 30% chance.
18
  
 
Companies on NASDAQ have higher loss percentages than companies on the NYSE/AMEX. 
Selected percentages over the 1980 to 2000 period are:  
 
Year 
NASDAQ 
Companies 
NYSE/AMEX 
Companies 
All  
Companies 
1980 23.6% 21.3% 21.5% 
1985 21.5% 16.7% 18.5% 
1990 31.5% 21.5% 25.6% 
1995 27.5% 15.7% 21.9% 
2000 40.5% 18.3% 31.0% 
2001 44.1% 25.5% 36.0% 
2004 36.4% 20.3% 29.4% 
 
NASDAQ companies are, on average, smaller and younger than companies on the NYSE/AMEX. 
Size and age have been found to useful predictors of financial distress [Altman, 2000].  
                                                 
18
 The proposition that the percentage of losses has increased over time is supported by a univariate 
regression of the percentage loss on a time trend. The trend term is positive and significant. Fama and 
French [2004] report evidence of an increase in loss rates for newly listed companies. 
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Figure 1 
Market Capitalization to Revenue Multiple Percentiles (90
th
, 70
th
, 50
th
, 30
th
, and 10
th
) for 
Sample One (All NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Public Companies), Sample Two (Internet Public 
Companies) and Sample Three (Venture-Backed Private Companies): 1980 to 2004 
 
Sample One 
Selected SIC Industries (Public)
a
 
Sample One 
All Other Companies (Public) 
  
Sample Two  
Internet Companies (Public) 
Sample Three  
V.C. Backed Companies (Private) 
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Figure 2 – Panel A 
Annual Market Capitalization-to-Revenue Multiple Percentiles for Sample One Companies 
in Selected SIC Industries for Various Company Size Categories: 1980 - 2004 
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Figure 2 – Panel B 
 
Annual Market Capitalization-to-Revenue Multiple Percentiles for Sample Two and 
Sample Three Companies for Various Company Size Categories: 1980 - 2004 
 B. Sample Two – Internet (Public) C. Sample Three – VC Backed 
(Private) 
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Figure 3 
Annual Revenue Growth Percentiles (10
th
, 30
th
, 50
th
, 70
th
, and 90
th
) and Interdecile Range 
(90
th
 – 10th) for Publicly Traded Companies on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ: 1980 to 2004 
 
Panel A: Selected SIC Industries (Hardware, Software, Telecom, Biotech/Pharma)  
 
 
Panel B: All Other Companies 
 
 
Panel C: Annual Interpercentile (90
th
 – 10th) Range 
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Figure 4 
Annual Revenue Growth Rates For Publicly-Traded Companies and Private Venture-Backed Companies: 1996 – 2004 
Selected SIC Industries vs. All Other Companies vs. Internet Companies vs. Venture-Backed Companies 
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Figure 5 – Panel A 
Median Annual Portfolio Revenue Growth in Years t, t+1, and t+2 for Portfolios Formed  
Using MKTt/REVt Rankings: 10 Portfolios with Positive Revenue Growth in Year t 
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Figure 5 – Panel B 
Median Annual Portfolio Revenue Growth in Years t, t+1, and t+2 for Portfolios Formed 
Using MKTt/REVt Rankings: 10 Portfolios with Negative Revenue Growth in Year t 
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Table 1 
 
Summary Statistics on Three Samples: Sample One (All NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Public 
Companies), Sample Two (Internet Public Companies) and Sample Three (Venture-
Backed Private Companies). 
 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
 
Panel C 
 
 
 
No. of Companies
Sample Two - Internet Companies (Public) 1/1/1998 3/10/2000 12/31/2001 3/10/2000
I.  All Internet Companies $80 $1,630 $279 367
II.  PooledSelected Internet SIC Industries 77 1,500 256 260
     II.A.  Internet - Computer Hardware 57 653 158 21
     II.B.  Internet - Computer Software 17 726 72 178
     II.C.  Internet - Telecommunications 2 47 2 23
     II.D.  Internet - Business Services 1 75 24 38
III.  All Other Internet  Companies 3 130 23 107
Aggregate Market Capitalization ($ Billions)
Number of Number with Internet Coy's
Sample Three - VC Backed Companies (Private) Companies IPO with IPO(c)
I.  All VentureOne Companies 11,910 1,262 239
     I.A.  Software (a) 4,811 388 134
     I.B.  Consumer-Business Services 2,272 127 48
     I.C.  Communications 1,604 195 53
     I.D.  Biopharmaceuticals 1,008 231 0
     I.E.  Hardware/Equipment (b) 2,215 321 4
(a) Comprises the ―Software‖ and ―Information Services‖ Industry Segments of VentureOne. 
(b) Comprises the ―Medical Devices,‖ ―Electronics,‖ and ―Semiconductors‖ Industry Segments of VentureOne. 
(c) The Internet company list (taken from Jay Ritter‘s website) is combined with the VentureOne listing to identify the 
VentureOne Internet companies with an IPO. 
 
No. of Companies 
Sample One - NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Companies (Public) 1/1/1998 3/10/2000 12/31/2001 3/10/2000 
I. All Companies $11,051 $18,398 $14,212 8,401 
II. Pooled Selected SIC Industries 2,849 9,262 4,593 1,932 
 (357, 366, 367, 737, 481, 283) 
 II.A. Computer Hardware (357,366,367) 933 4,098 1,612 615 
 II.B. Computer Software (737) 550 2,504 979 792 
 II.C. Telecommunications (481) 528 1,387 625 190 
 II.D. Biotech/Pharma (283) 839 1,273 1,377 335 
III. All Other Companies 8,202 9,135 9,619 6,469 
Aggregate Market Capitalization ($ Billions) 
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Table 2 
Mean Autocorrelations for First Differenced Annual Financial Series  
for Sample One (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Publicly-Traded Companies): 1980-2004  
 
 r1 r2 r3 r4 
Revenues 
Selected SIC Industries 
All Other Companies 
 
0.36 
0.18 
 
0.18 
0.02 
 
0.16 
0.07 
 
0.17 
0.09 
Operating Income 
Selected SIC Industries 
All Other Companies 
 
0.03 
-0.10 
 
-0.06 
-0.01 
 
0.03 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
0.01 
Income Before Extraordinary Items 
Selected SIC Industries 
All Other Companies 
 
-0.25 
-0.27 
 
-0.07 
-0.04 
 
-0.10 
-0.07 
 
0.02 
0.02 
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Table 3 
 
Annual Revenue Growth Rate Percentiles (10
th
, 20
th…90th) By Company Size  
Category ($ Millions: I, $0-$5; II, $5-$25; III, $25-$100; IV, $100-$1,000; > $1,000)  
For Samples One, Two, and Three 
 
  
 
 
 
Revenue 
Growth 
Rate 
Percentiles 
Revenue 
Growth 
Rate 
Percentiles 
Revenue 
Growth 
Rate 
Percentiles 
Revenue 
Growth 
Rate 
Percentiles 
I II III IV V Pooled
$0 - $5 $5 - $25 $25 - $100 $100 - $1,000 > $1,000 All
10th pctle -85.4% -32.8% -21.5% -13.2% -8.6% -33.4%
20th pctle -56.7% -17.9% -8.2% -2.1% -0.1% -13.6%
30th pctle -37.4% -7.9% 0.3% 4.5% 4.2% -2.8%
40th pctle -19.7% 0.8% 7.5% 10.2% 7.5% 4.8%
50th pctle -4.3% 8.4% 14.4% 15.7% 10.8% 11.4%
60th pctle 10.4% 17.2% 22.0% 22.1% 14.3% 18.8%
70th pctle 31.3% 28.4% 31.9% 31.0% 19.4% 28.7%
80th pctle 76.3% 46.0% 46.7% 45.5% 26.3% 45.6%
90th pctle 233.2% 94.0% 79.6% 75.6% 41.6% 89.3%
nobs 5,090            6,872                   7,184                 6,920                 2,969               29,035          
I II III IV V Pooled
$0 - $5 $5 - $25 $25 - $100 $100 - $1,000 > $1,000 All
10th pctle -84.5% -26.0% -16.2% -9.9% -8.2% -19.9%
20th pctle -52.5% -11.7% -5.5% -2.3% -1.6% -6.6%
30th pctle -31.3% -3.8% 0.5% 2.3% 2.0% -0.2%
40th pctle -15.7% 2.1% 5.0% 6.0% 5.1% 4.3%
50th pctle -3.5% 7.4% 9.4% 9.7% 7.9% 8.4%
60th pctle 7.6% 13.6% 14.4% 13.7% 10.9% 12.9%
70th pctle 23.6% 21.8% 21.0% 18.8% 14.8% 18.9%
80th pctle 55.4% 35.5% 31.1% 26.4% 20.6% 28.6%
90th pctle 157.0% 70.9% 54.1% 43.0% 33.4% 52.7%
nobs 13,702          20,752                 26,974               43,222               22,043             126,693        
I II III IV V Pooled
$0 - $5 $5 - $25 $25 - $100 $100 - $1,000 > $1,000 All
10th pctle -86.6% -38.0% -23.7% -12.3% -8.2% -28.8%
20th pctle -51.6% -15.4% -5.0% 0.8% 0.1% -8.0%
30th pctle -17.4% 5.1% 11.3% 8.5% 5.9% 7.4%
40th pctle 29.0% 34.8% 26.7% 22.2% 10.6% 24.3%
50th pctle 70.2% 64.1% 48.7% 34.1% 13.7% 47.1%
60th pctle 163.0% 109.7% 78.2% 54.8% 26.0% 77.3%
70th pctle 295.8% 194.4% 130.3% 87.5% 48.9% 129.2%
80th pctle 684.9% 320.3% 224.6% 144.8% 68.4% 233.8%
90th pctle 1359.2% 632.5% 448.5% 296.8% 90.5% 523.6%
nobs 229               596                      690                    571                    93                    2,179            
I II III IV V Pooled
$0 - $5 $5 - $25 $25 - $100 $100 - $1,000 > $1,000 All
10th pctle -33.4% 5.2% 3.4% 1.1% -2.1%
20th pctle 0.0% 20.0% 12.7% 6.9% 12.1%
30th pctle 22.9% 32.8% 20.9% 12.9% 25.0%
40th pctle 49.7% 47.0% 30.2% 18.5% 39.1%
50th pctle 79.3% 64.2% 40.1% 26.2% 56.0%
60th pctle 127.3% 89.4% 52.2% 35.6% 80.6%
70th pctle 200.0% 119.9% 70.6% 45.0% 118.5%
80th pctle 356.3% 197.1% 103.9% 73.2% 200.0%
90th pctle 771.6% 393.1% 195.7% 113.7% 422.2%
nobs 1,610            1,965                   1,034                 287                    4,896            
Sample Three - Venture Capital-Backed Companies (Private): Company Size Categories
Sample One - Selected SIC Industries (Public): Company Size Categories
Sample One - All Other Companies (Public): Company Size Categories
Sample Two - Internet Companies (Public): Company Size Categories
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Table 4 
MKTt/REVt Multiple Distribution Summary for Subsamples Formed On Sign of Revenue Growth in Year t 
 
 
Sample One Selected SIC
Total 
Obs.
10th 
Perc.
50th 
Perc.
90th 
Perc.
10th 
Perc.
50th 
Perc.
90th 
Perc.
10th 
Perc.
50th 
Perc.
90th 
Perc.
1995 1484 0.5 2.3 11.2 906 61.1% 0.2 1.3 52.0 275 18.5% 0.6 3.6 55.4 303 20.4%
1998 1962 0.5 2.2 11.8 1165 59.4% 0.3 1.2 26.4 574 29.3% 0.8 5.2 80.1 223 11.4%
1999 2154 0.6 3.2 27.3 1182 54.9% 0.3 1.8 47.1 564 26.2% 1.7 31.6 365.8 408 18.9%
2000 2313 0.4 2.8 26.4 1313 56.8% 0.2 1.5 45.3 582 25.2% 1.0 9.8 132.0 418 18.1%
2001 2168 0.5 2.8 22.3 1067 49.2% 0.2 1.4 24.1 950 43.8% 0.7 6.7 145.7 151 7.0%
2004 1726 0.7 2.5 16.0 1146 66.4% 0.4 2.6 114.5 468 27.1% 1.2 11.7 1,277.2 112 6.5%
Sample One
All Other
1995 6524 0.2 1.0 3.8 4453 68.3% 0.1 0.8 7.3 1193 18.3% 0.2 1.4 14.7 878 13.5%
1998 6767 0.2 1.1 4.0 4395 64.9% 0.1 0.8 5.6 1801 26.6% 0.3 1.8 12.3 571 8.4%
1999 6710 0.2 0.9 4.0 4198 62.6% 0.1 0.8 6.7 1865 27.8% 0.4 2.3 104.1 647 9.6%
2000 6451 0.1 0.9 4.2 4526 70.2% 0.0 0.5 10.5 1461 22.6% 0.4 2.6 83.9 464 7.2%
2001 6075 0.2 1.1 4.8 3394 55.9% 0.1 0.6 4.5 2322 38.2% 0.3 2.0 132.3 359 5.9%
2004 4966 0.3 1.5 5.7 3642 73.3% 0.2 1.5 12.0 1067 21.5% 0.7 4.3 330.3 257 5.2%
Sample Two
Internet
1995 17 0.4 1.4 8.7 10 58.8% 0.0% 1.0 23.5 2,101.6 7 41.2%
1998 69 1.6 6.1 28.0 33 47.8% 0.1 4.3 10.5 9 13.0% 4.3 24.4 91.7 27 39.1%
1999 275 2.1 11.9 113.6 50 18.2% 0.6 2.0 37.2 11 4.0% 6.8 44.5 282.3 214 77.8%
2000 379 0.3 2.4 20.6 207 54.6% 0.1 1.3 60.9 15 4.0% 0.9 6.9 67.1 157 41.4%
2001 319 0.4 2.4 10.4 175 54.9% 0.2 1.5 4.9 124 38.9% 0.6 3.6 12.7 20 6.3%
2004 202 0.8 3.0 11.0 139 68.8% 0.5 2.3 23.4 59 29.2% 1.0 1.9 30.5 4 2.0%
Sample Three
V.C. Private Backed
1995 262 0.7 3.8 17.7 186 71.0% 0.8 13.0 190.0 22 8.4% 1.2 26.4 203.3 54 20.6%
1998 274 1.7 10.0 60.0 147 53.6% 2.1 14.5 211.1 15 5.5% 4.8 27.6 300.0 112 40.9%
1999 361 2.6 16.5 83.2 238 65.9% 3.5 16.3 600.0 25 6.9% 2.1 34.3 648.5 98 27.1%
2000 254 3.5 24.2 160.8 150 59.1% 4.9 81.5 739.0 17 6.7% 3.8 56.2 1,971.1 87 34.3%
2001 107 1.5 5.3 45.3 51 47.7% 1.1 19.1 1,649.7 9 8.4% 1.4 10.0 397.5 47 43.9%
2004 88 1.0 6.9 24.8 57 64.8% 11.2 400.0 5,068.8 5 5.7% 0.8 4.0 538.2 26 29.5%
Positive Revenue Growth Subsample Negative Revenue Growth Subsample Missing Revenue Growth Subsample
Nob's
% of 
Total 
Sample
MKT/Rev Multiple
Nob's Nob's
% of 
Total 
Sample
% of 
Total 
Sample
MKT/Rev Multiple MKT/Rev Multiple
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Table 5 
Transition Matrix for Revenue Growth Decile in Year t and Year t+1 for Sample One 
Selected SIC Industries and All Other Companies: 1980 – 2004 
(Portfolio 1 is lowest revenue growth…Portfolio 10 is highest revenue growth) 
 
Panel A - Selected SIC Industries 
 
Panel B - All Other Companies  
 
Panel C – Sample Two (Internet Companies) 
 
Panel D – Sample Three (Venture-backed Companies)  
 
  
port1 port2 port3 port4 port5 port6 port7 port8 port9 port10 Total
port 1 27.42% 14.07% 8.35% 5.52% 5.39% 4.64% 4.87% 5.69% 6.11% 17.95% 100.00%
port 2 13.68% 19.40% 15.91% 10.16% 7.96% 7.96% 7.73% 6.74% 5.56% 4.93% 100.00%
port 3 8.31% 12.68% 17.02% 16.73% 12.36% 10.25% 7.76% 7.03% 4.63% 3.22% 100.00%
port 4 5.29% 8.05% 13.02% 21.96% 19.07% 12.16% 8.28% 5.62% 4.08% 2.47% 100.00%
port 5 4.70% 7.36% 9.73% 13.71% 19.99% 16.80% 12.26% 7.50% 5.33% 2.63% 100.00%
port 6 4.63% 7.66% 9.92% 9.99% 12.45% 17.75% 17.19% 10.45% 6.87% 3.09% 100.00%
port 7 5.75% 7.76% 7.96% 8.05% 9.14% 12.85% 16.40% 16.40% 10.68% 5.00% 100.00%
port 8 6.87% 7.92% 7.56% 6.61% 6.18% 8.54% 12.42% 18.63% 18.17% 7.10% 100.00%
port 9 8.97% 7.33% 6.18% 4.31% 4.93% 6.31% 8.45% 14.00% 23.77% 15.75% 100.00%
port 10 14.37% 7.76% 4.37% 2.96% 2.53% 2.76% 4.64% 7.96% 14.79% 37.87% 100.00%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Missing 8.64% 4.10% 3.40% 3.31% 3.76% 5.39% 7.37% 11.04% 17.04% 35.95% 100.00%
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Revenue Growth in Year t+1
port1 port2 port3 port4 port5 port6 port7 port8 port9 port10 Total
port 1 29.60% 13.37% 7.84% 5.26% 5.00% 4.60% 4.92% 5.70% 7.60% 16.10% 100.00%
port 2 14.55% 19.06% 14.94% 10.78% 8.48% 7.28% 6.80% 6.37% 6.01% 5.72% 100.00%
port 3 7.96% 13.95% 17.38% 16.26% 12.12% 9.92% 7.96% 6.01% 4.95% 3.49% 100.00%
port 4 5.82% 10.23% 13.91% 17.52% 16.12% 12.26% 9.37% 6.64% 4.91% 3.22% 100.00%
port 5 4.76% 8.37% 11.58% 15.02% 16.20% 14.93% 11.57% 8.37% 5.97% 3.21% 100.00%
port 6 4.68% 7.55% 9.62% 10.52% 13.97% 16.19% 15.19% 10.96% 7.23% 4.09% 100.00%
port 7 4.78% 6.96% 8.24% 8.71% 10.85% 13.58% 15.77% 15.44% 10.41% 5.26% 100.00%
port 8 5.47% 7.05% 6.38% 6.86% 7.96% 10.27% 13.96% 18.02% 16.02% 8.03% 100.00%
port 9 8.39% 7.31% 5.64% 5.60% 5.84% 6.92% 9.17% 14.39% 20.77% 15.97% 100.00%
port 10 13.99% 6.14% 4.46% 3.46% 3.47% 4.05% 5.29% 8.09% 16.13% 34.93% 100.00%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Missing 8.36% 5.35% 6.02% 5.45% 5.55% 6.28% 7.58% 10.08% 14.23% 31.09% 100.00%
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port1 port2 port3 port4 port5 port6 port7 port8 port9 port10 Total
port 1 26.67% 20.00% 13.94% 7.27% 9.09% 6.06% 4.24% 2.42% 4.24% 6.06% 100.00%
port 2 11.45% 19.88% 21.69% 15.06% 15.06% 9.64% 4.22% 1.20% 1.20% 0.60% 100.00%
port 3 4.82% 10.84% 20.48% 28.31% 18.07% 11.45% 3.01% 1.20% 1.20% 0.60% 100.00%
port 4 6.06% 7.27% 10.91% 18.79% 18.18% 16.36% 13.94% 3.64% 1.82% 3.03% 100.00%
port 5 7.83% 6.63% 6.02% 9.04% 16.27% 17.47% 19.88% 7.83% 6.02% 3.01% 100.00%
port 6 7.23% 10.24% 6.02% 7.83% 8.43% 13.25% 21.69% 12.65% 7.23% 5.42% 100.00%
port 7 13.33% 9.70% 8.48% 4.85% 4.85% 6.67% 10.91% 19.39% 16.97% 4.85% 100.00%
port 8 9.64% 6.02% 6.02% 3.01% 4.22% 6.02% 12.65% 25.30% 16.87% 10.24% 100.00%
port 9 7.23% 7.23% 4.82% 4.22% 3.01% 7.23% 5.42% 15.66% 21.08% 24.10% 100.00%
port 10 5.45% 2.42% 1.82% 1.21% 3.03% 6.06% 3.64% 10.91% 23.64% 41.82% 100.00%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Missing 2.59% 1.20% 0.80% 2.20% 5.59% 7.19% 11.98% 12.38% 16.77% 39.32% 100.00%
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port1 port2 port3 port4 port5 port6 port7 port8 port9 port10 Total
port 1 21.25% 12.89% 9.76% 5.92% 6.62% 6.62% 6.62% 9.06% 7.32% 13.94% 100.00%
port 2 13.89% 24.65% 20.49% 12.85% 7.99% 4.86% 5.21% 3.82% 2.78% 3.47% 100.00%
port 3 10.76% 14.24% 21.53% 16.67% 12.85% 6.60% 5.56% 4.51% 3.13% 4.17% 100.00%
port 4 10.42% 15.97% 13.19% 19.44% 17.01% 10.42% 6.25% 2.78% 3.47% 1.04% 100.00%
port 5 8.68% 6.94% 12.50% 12.15% 16.32% 12.85% 12.85% 7.29% 6.25% 4.17% 100.00%
port 6 9.38% 9.72% 5.56% 12.15% 12.85% 16.32% 14.58% 10.07% 5.90% 3.47% 100.00%
port 7 7.99% 5.90% 6.94% 7.29% 11.46% 17.01% 12.50% 14.58% 10.42% 5.90% 100.00%
port 8 6.55% 4.14% 2.41% 4.48% 6.90% 14.48% 15.17% 20.69% 13.45% 11.72% 100.00%
port 9 5.59% 4.55% 4.90% 6.29% 4.55% 6.29% 16.43% 16.78% 19.23% 15.38% 100.00%
port 10 5.23% 1.05% 2.79% 2.79% 3.48% 4.53% 4.88% 10.45% 28.22% 36.59% 100.00%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Missing 10.51% 7.10% 5.97% 5.38% 6.22% 6.96% 6.86% 7.20% 12.78% 31.03% 100.00%
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Revenue Growth in Year t+1
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Table 6 
Correlation For 10 Portfolios Ranked on MKTt/REVt Between (A) Median MKT/REV and 
Median Annual Revenue Growth, and (B) Annual Revenue Growth Across Time Periods 
 
 
Panel A: Correlation Between Median MKT/REV and  
Median Annual Revenue Growth for 10 Portfolios 
 Sample One Sample Two Sample Three 
 
Selected SIC 
Industries 
All Other 
Companies 
Internet 
Companies 
VC Backed 
Companies 
Positive Revenue Growth Portfolios     
 MKTt/REVt & REV Growtht/t-1     
 Pearson 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.83 
 Spearman 1.00 0.98 0.60 0.92 
 MKTt/REVt & REV Growtht+1/t     
 Pearson 0.93 0.97 0.98 1.00 
 Spearman 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 
 MKTt/REVt & REV Growtht+2/t+1     
 Pearson 0.86 0.92 -0.04 0.99 
 Spearman 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.98 
     
Negative Revenue Growth Portfolios     
 MKTt/REVt & REV Growtht/t-1     
 Pearson -0.98 -0.99 -0.93 -0.92 
 Spearman -0.80 -0.51 0.01 -0.83 
 MKTt/REVt & REV Growtht+1/t     
 Pearson 0.97 0.89 0.87 0.79 
 Spearman 1.00 0.99 0.78 0.90 
 MKTt/REVt & REV Growtht+2/t+1     
 Pearson 0.91 0.72 0.59 0.70 
 Spearman 0.99 0.96 0.45 0.89 
 
Panel B: Correlation Between Median Annual Revenue  
Growth of Portfolios Across Time Periods 
 Sample One Sample Two Sample Three 
 
Selected SIC 
Industries 
All Other 
Companies 
Internet 
Companies 
VC Backed 
Companies 
Positive Revenue Growth Portfolios     
 Year t & Year t+1     
 Pearson 0.99 0.95 0.91 0.83 
 Spearman 1.00 0.99 0.71 0.92 
 Year t & Year t+2     
 Pearson 0.94 0.89 -0.03 0.86 
 Spearman 0.99 0.99 0.17 0.96 
 Year t+1 & Year t+2     
 Pearson 0.98 0.98 0.06 0.99 
 Spearman 1.00 1.00 0.31 0.98 
     
Negative Revenue Growth Portfolios     
 Year t & Year t+1     
 Pearson -0.98 -0.82 -0.76 -0.90 
 Spearman -0.80 -0.46 -0.01 -0.89 
 Year t & Year t+2     
 Pearson -0.95 -0.62 -0.63 -0.84 
 Spearman -0.78 -0.34 -0.42 -0.74 
 Year t+1 & Year t+2     
 Pearson 0.98 0.95 0.45 0.90 
 Spearman 0.99 0.98 0.37 0.80 
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Table 7 
Regression Analysis (Rank Regression) Using (a) MKTt/REVt As Dependent Variable, and 
(b) Revenue Growth, Company Size, Profitability and Other Variables 
 
 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Regression #1
Intercept 19538 202.73 85789 431.18 1085 38.82 1108 97.45
log(REV) -0.29 -52.20 -0.31 -117.19 -0.21 -11.07 -0.83 -50.87
Adj. R-sq 8.2% 9.5% 7.1% 68.1%
Regression #2
Intercept 10508 104.04 52538 246.43 400 21.31 385 16.88
Current Rev Growth 0.26 36.82 0.17 49.25 0.39 19.00 0.32 6.14
Adj. R-sq 5.2% 2.2% 20.8% 4.7%
Regression #3
Intercept 14875 114.63 72816 261.31 724 23.68 1022 43.18
log(REV) -0.26 -45.07 -0.27 -97.74 -0.19 -11.28 -0.78 -33.90
Current Rev Growth 0.29 43.09 0.17 55.05 0.39 20.23 0.15 4.64
Adj. R-sq 12.0% 9.6% 25.8% 62.1%
Regression #3b
Intercept 14750 118.47 69869 266.45 624 20.32 946 47.00
log(REV) -0.27 -51.38 -0.29 -115.26 -0.13 -8.22 -0.73 -40.11
Future Rev Growth 0.30 56.80 0.23 89.75 0.39 24.01 0.18 9.61
Adj. R-sq 17.1% 14.7% 31.7% 70.4%
Regression #4
Intercept 7876 66.89 43583 175.96 261 14.059 232 9.63
Current Rev Growth 0.19 27.37 0.10 29.15 0.22 10.88 0.11 2.19
Future Rev Growth 0.25 40.18 0.21 67.32 0.32 17.89 0.45 12.46
Adj. R-sq 11.1% 6.0% 35.7% 20.9%
Regression #5
Intercept 11394 81.6 61103 203.69 445 15.282 936 32.40
log(REV) -0.25 -43.27 -0.27 -95.92 -0.13 -8.07 -0.73 -29.62
Current Rev Growth 0.22 32.68 0.11 33.68 0.24 11.76 0.10 3.02
Future Rev Growth 0.24 39.89 0.20 66.61 0.29 16.35 0.13 5.07
Adj. R-sq 17.3% 13.3% 38.6% 63.3%
Regression #6
Intercept -7539 -19.27 -51279 -97.28 1066 108.94
INC/REV 0.57 47.94 0.84 245.32 -0.33 0.08
NEG INC/REV 0.90 69.37 0.90 199.91 -0.14 0.08
Adj. R-sq 15.7% 30.2% 4.3%
Regression #7
Intercept -7793 -25.15 -24675 -46.36 138 1.31 982.82 41.76
log(REV) -0.21 -36.27 -0.22 -90.81 -0.17 -4.35 -0.7715 -33.9815
Current Rev Growth 0.15 29.38 0.04 19.19 0.02 0.84 0.13462 4.34423
Future Rev Growth 0.25 49.61 0.18 79.31 0.45 19.44 2.79494 2.51403
INC/REV 0.65 56.61 0.76 233.64 0.20 2.01
NEG INC/REV 0.90 73.12 0.75 163.21 0.30 3.43
Leverage -0.16 -29.39 -0.10 -45.38 -0.14 -5.89
1998-2000 Dummy 1993 19.54 4131 17.87 190 10.48 181.214 10.379
Adj. R-sq 36.9% 43.6% 40.1% 67.2%
Sample One Sample Two Sample Three
Selected SIC All Other Internet VC-backed
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Table 8 
Sample One Regression Analysis (Rank Regression) Using MKTt/REVt as Dependent Variables 
For Three Subsamples Based on Sign of Current Revenue Growth  
(Panel A: Positive; Panel B: Negative; Panel C: Missing Observations) 
 
 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -5830.62 -29.74 -20794.45 -54.55 
log(REV) -0.06 -8.43 -0.13 -46.55 
Current Rev Growth 0.22 33.17 0.10 34.98 
Future Rev Growth 0.18 27.40 0.14 49.79 
INC/REV 0.66 58.83 0.77 225.51 
NEG INC/REV 0.89 65.96 0.76 135.24 
Leverage -0.15 -22.73 -0.08 -29.73 
1998-2000 Period 1075.88 14.10 1937.86 11.55 
R-sq 41.68% 49.37% 
nobs 15,131     73,574     
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 1198.46 5.32 -1170.76 -3.65 
log(REV) -0.28 -17.90 -0.30 -54.19 
Current Rev Growth -0.09 -6.82 -0.11 -19.60 
Future Rev Growth 0.20 18.35 0.16 33.26 
INC/REV 0.34 8.58 0.80 81.67 
NEG INC/REV 0.56 15.22 0.64 56.65 
Leverage -0.13 -11.23 -0.12 -22.85 
1998-2000 Period 252.60 4.53 695.91 5.52 
R-sq 26.62% 32.89% 
nobs 6,353     27,929     
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -7.75 -0.07 -1007.32 -5.39 
log(REV) -0.26 -20.02 -0.36 -55.49 
Current Rev Growth 
Future Rev Growth 0.25 23.62 0.24 42.57 
INC/REV 0.39 15.26 0.57 66.29 
NEG INC/REV 0.79 28.56 0.78 64.24 
Leverage -0.20 -18.66 -0.11 -19.51 
1998-2000 Period 277.61 8.08 1145.19 12.80 
R-sq 56.56% 53.69% 
nobs 4064 15681 
Missing Current Revenue Growth 
Selected SIC All Other 
Selected SIC All Other 
Positive Current Revenue Growth 
Selected SIC All Other 
Negative Current Revenue Growth 
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